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Afurder-Misconduct of Jury.
The fact that after the cause was submitted to the jury some of the
jurors were allowed to stand on the courthouse porch, where they could
hear citizens discussing the merits of the case, and insisting on the
defendant's guilt, is ground for setting aside a verdict of guilty and
granting a new trial.
FACTS OF THE CASE.

When the attorney-general concluded his argument, it
was followed by loud, general and continuous applause for
some moments by the citizens of Washington and Madison
Counties, who filled the courthouse to its full capacity.
Upon affidavit that the cause was submitted to the
jury on Saturday and that on Sunday they were given the
liberty of the courtroom, the' doors and windows of which
stood open; that some of the jurors left the courtroom and
remained for, some time upon the porches of the courthouse; that divers citizens of the above-named counties
were in the courthouse yard within fifteen feet of the
jurors, excitedly discussing the case, insisting upon the
guilt of the defendant, and so continued for hours, C. J.
COCKRILL

said:

"The unimpeached affidavit made a prima fade case
that some or all of the jurors had been exposed to improper
influence, and it cast upon the prosecution the burden of
showing that the jury had not been so exposed, or that the
exposure was of a character that could not or did not
influence them. . . . When the means of contradic1

20 S. W. Rep., 588 (1892).
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tion were so easily to be.obtained, we must infer that the
staiements of the affidavit are true, else the proof to the
Judgment reversed.
, cdntrary would be forthcoming."
New trial ordered.
MISCONDUCT OF JURY.
The process of trial by jury is
to-day regarded, substantially, as a
birthright by American citizens,
and the deliberations of this august body are watched with jealous care.
But the early restrictive principles have been modified in most
of the United States, and even in
England, and the purity of jury
trials is made to depend not on
form, but on substance.
A fair and unbiased expression
of opinion is the aim, and while
certain acts of jurors may be
deemed irregular and even reprehensible, they may not be sufficiently culpable to disturb their
verdict.
Use of Liquors by urors.--As
to indulgence in liquors some 61d
cases require total abstinence. The
modern rule is more liberal. The
mere fact that a juror in a civil
cause drank intoxicating liquors
during an adjournment of Court,
is not a sufficient legal reason for
granting a new trial, unless there
be suspicion of its influence upon
the verdict: R. R. v. Porter, 32 0.,
327; or unless it was supplied from
an improper source: State v. Upton, 20 Mo., 397. See Wilson v.
Abrahams, I Hill (N. Y.), 207, a
leading case.
A verdict will not be set aside
for such misconduct of jurors in a
crichinal or even in a capital proceeding, unless it be such as might
affect their impartiality or disqualify them from the proper ex-

ercise of their legal functions:
Pratt v. State, S6 Ind., x79; State
v. Livingstone, 64 10., 56o; State v.
Cucuel, 2 Vroom (N. J. , 249;
State v. Tatlow, 34 Kan., 8o.
With State v. Tatlow contrast
People v. Gray, 61 Cal., 164, where,
during the trial, large quantities of
liquors were procured and consumed by the jury immediately
preceding their deliberation, and
there was strong reason to believe
that one juror was druuk and unable to properly discharge his duty.
The verdict was set aside.
The misconduct of a juror, essential to justify a new trial, must be
gross and must have resulted in
probable injury to the complaining
party; or, as the Court said in
State v. Washburn, 91 Mo., 571,
"to affect the yerdict (guilty of
felonious assault,, the circumstances must, at least, be such as
to create a reasonable suspicion
that the drinking may have improperly influenced it."
A different conclusion was
reached in certain criminal cases
where a juror, after retiring to
consider upon the verdict, left the
jury room in charge of the officer,
went to a grocery store, procured
and drank a glass of beer, after
which he returned to the jury
room and participated in finding
the verdict: Iowa v. Baldy, 17 10.,
39; Ryan v. Harrow, 27 1o., 494;
Weiss v. State, 22 Oh., 486. In
the latter case the Court said: "If
j urors were permitted at their
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pleasure to leave their retirement
during their deliberations for the
purpose of visiting drinking saloons, the purity of the system
would be vitiated."
Where, however, the jury used
intoxicating liquors in their retirement, the Missouri Courts refused
to disturb a conviction of murder,
unless the liquor be supplied from
an improper source or affected the
verdict. The -Court said: "No
Court would be warranted in receiving a verdict against a prisoner
from a jury, any iember of which
was in the least under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. Buttohold
that a verdict should be set aside
for the use of ardent spirits by a
jury, not carried to excess, when
such spirits are not supplied from
a source interested or calculated to
bias the minds of jurors, would be
establishing a rule which- would
result in no practical good and
prove very burdensome to the parties:" State v. Barber, 74 Mo.,
292.

On the other hand, in Leighton
v. Sargent, 31 N.. H., II8, the use
of brandy as a beverage by jurors,
in the jury room, while deliberating upon their verdict, was held to
furnish a sufficiint cause for granting a new trial, although the quantity drunk be small and no indications are shown and no suspicions
are entertaified by the other jurors
that the jurors who partook of it are
under the influence of spirituous
liquors, and the liquor is furnished
by the attending officer, at the
request of the jurors, the excuse
being illness.
This same State holds, however,
that a vernict will not be disturbed
because a juror has privately taken
in an ante-room, apart from and
without the knowledge of his fel-

JURY.

lows, as a medicine previously
prescribed by his physician, for the
relief of a disease under which he
was manifestly laboring, a small
quantity of spirituous liquor during the deliberations of the jury:
Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H., io8.
In this case his decision had been
finally made before taking.
Same result in Nichols v. Nichols, 136 Mass., 256. See also U. S.'
v. Gilbert, 21 Sum. (U. S.), 19; Roman v. State, 41 Wis., 312; O'Neill
v. R. R. Co., 45 1o., 546.
Influence and Effect of Favors,
etc.-As a general rule, refreshments procured without the consent of the Court subject the jurors'
to punishment, but do not vitiate
their verdict. But where the sheriff'
interested in a reward treated the
jurors: People v. Myers, 70 Cal.,582;
and where the successful defendant paid the expenses of a jury of
viewers, they knowing the fact:
Dond v. Guthrie, 13 111. App., 653;
and where an attorney arranged a
surprise party for a juror: Stafford
v. Oskaloosa, i, N. W. Rep., 668;
and where the prevailing party at
the request of two jurors loaned
them his horse and buggy to convey them home: Ensign v. Harney, 15 Neb., 330; aliter Hudgins,
v. State, 61 Ga., 182; Bonnett v.
Glattfeldt, 120 Ill., 166-the several verdicts were set aside, because
of the flagrant breach of duty on
the part of the jurors and parties,,
although they may have acted
without thought of misconduct.
Johnson v. Greim, 17 Neb., 447,
does not conflict with Ensign v.
Harney, sufira. The jury dined
with the defendant only because it
was the only convenient place, the
bailiff paying for the meal and the
defendant having no conversation
with the jury. Upon this subject
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see exhaustive opinion by C. J.
SHAw, Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick.
(Mass.), 496.
The stringent rule that favors
of an interested party will nullify
a verdict, has not* a ways been
enforced. In Patton v. Mfg. Co.
ii R. I., a88, where plaintiff and
his sons entertained a jury of
viewers, but there was no apparent
intefition to predispose the jury or
influence them in favor of them or
against the defendant, the Court
refused to disturb the verdict, saying
"there must be strong preponderance of evidence against it," and
it was not so shown: Similiter
'Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt., 44o.
Where the inhabitants of a town,
a party to the suit, furnished food
and drink to a jury, but acted within the limits of'ordinary hospitality, without any improper design
or improper influence on the verdict, the verdict was upheld : Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. See Rakin
8
v. Morris Co., 24 N. J. L., 53 .
Sleeping of furors.-The fact
that a juror was asleep while a witness was testifying or an attorney
was making his argument, it not
appearing that the Court's attention was called to it, will not justify
a 'new trial. C. J. MAXW1II said
the attorney "should have called
the attention of the Court to the
juror's condition; having failed to
do so he cannot afterward complain :" Scott v. Waldeclk, 12 Neb.,
5, McClary v. State, 75 Ind., 260.
Reading of Newspapers by Jurors.-Such acts will not affect their
verdict, unless they contain influential or prejudicial reports or comments upon the case. The fact
that two jurors in a homicide trial
read a newspaper report of the preceding evidence in no sense calculated to influence their decision:

U. S. v. Reid,

12 How., 36.; or that
affiant is informed and believes
that newspapers were left in the
jury room and read by the jury
who convicted him of murder:
People v. Williams, 24 Cal., 3i;
State v. Cucuel, 2 Vroom, 249; or
that the jury used a newspaper
containing a portion of the judge's
charge, if the evidence of that fact
depends on the affidavit of a juror:
Com. v. Haines, i5 Phila., 363;
will not vitiate the verdict, the
Court saying "solemn and deliberate verdicts must not be set aside
without substantial reasons."
McCoy, 71 Cal., 395;
In People v,.
Carter v. State, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 44o;
Walker v. State, 37 Tex., 366, the
rule was more strictly enforced.

C. J.DZADRICIK, in the Tennessee
case, said "the "comments herle
were calculated to prejudice the
defendant, and it is well settled
that if facts are illegally before the
jury, which may have prejudiced
the prisoner, he is entitled to .a
new trial."
Communicationswith Strangers.
-The casual and involuntary hearing by jurors of reprehensible remarks of others, provided the jurors do not show approval and are
not influenced by them, will not
taint a verdict: Brake v. State,
4 Baxt., Tenn., 36r; Pettibone v.
Phelps, 13 Conn., 445. See especially Clement v. Spear, 56 Vt.,
401; and this rule holds whether
the cause be civil or criminal, a
capital felony or otherwise: People
v. Boggs, 20 Cal., 432; Coin. v.
Roby, 12 Pick., 496. A substantial reason for the rule is assigned
by J. HoGEoom in Hager v.
Hager, 38 Barb. (N. Y.), 92: From
the very mode of administering
justice in our courts, jurors are in
almost every case necessarily, more
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or less, brought into contact with
bystanders or strangers to the controversy, and we must be careful
not to countenance merely fanciful
or imaginary notions of prejudice
to the parties resulting therefrom."
Communications with Witnesses.
--When thejury communicate with
witnesses in the suit, the rule is invoked in all its rigidity. See Odle
v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.), 159; State
,. Hascall, 6 N. H., 352.
A new trial will result where the
jury re-examined in the jury room
a witness without the consent of
the court or parties: Luttrell v. R.
R. Co., 18 Mon. (Ky.), 291; and,
although he may repeat verbatim
his former testimony: Meil v.
Abel, 24 'Vend. (N. Y.), i85, or
where, Without t6e knowledge and
consent of the Court and parties
the jury visit with the witness the
place in dispute, for the purpose of
information: Deacon v. Shreve, 22
N. J. L., 176; Tyrrell v. Bristow,
E. C, L. R., 433. It is nothing less
than ex pare examination of evidence, and the extent of the influence is unknown.
Examination of Books of Law.
-Where
the jury after retiring for deliberation obtained from
the bailiff, for consultation, a
copy of Revised Statutes, without
the knowledge and consent of
Court or counsel, the criminal conviction was nullified: State v.
Smith, 6 R. I., 33. Jurors are the
sole ultimate judges of fact, but
must receive the law applicable to
the case solely from the publiclygiven instructions of the Court. In
this way the Court and jury are
made responsible for errors, each
in its own appropriate sphere. In
Burrows v. Unwin, 3 C. & P., 310,
Lord TENDZRDEN said, " The regular way is for the jury to come

into court and state their questions
and receive the law from the
Court."
But the mere presence of law
books in the jury room will not
vitiate the verdict unless the jury
were influenced by them: State v.
Hopper, 71 Mo., 425. See Williams
v. People, 24 Cal., 31.
Communications with Judges.Where a justice merely entered the
juryroom in the absence of the
parties and counsel, and while the
jurors -were deliberating: State v.
Harrington, 27 Kan., 414, or where
the judge wrote an answer to a
written question from the jury
without the knowledge of either
party: Cook v. Lovell, ii Io., 8o;
Sargent v. Roberts, i Pick., 341;
State v. Alexander, 66 Mo., 148;
State v. Patterson, 45 Vt., 308;
Plunkett v. Appleton, 51 How. Pr.
(N. Y.), 469; or where an associate
judge, without the knowledge of
counsel, entered the jury room at
the jurors' request, to explain the
charge of the Court, during a temporary, adjournment: Kirke v.
State, 14 Ohio Rep., 5II. In each
instance the judgment was reversed.
A judge has no more right to
commuuicate with the jury or invade their sanctity after they have
retired than any other person, and
his entrance can be regarded only
in the same light as the entry of
any third person. See, aliter,
Allen, Cummings & Co. v. Aldrich,
29 N. H., 63; Goldsmith v. Solomons, 2 Stohl (S. C.), 296; People
v. Kelley, 94 N. Y., 526.
Communicationswith Partiesor
TheirFriends.-Wherea juror, after a conversation with a third person prejudicial to the interest of the
unsuccessful party, received from
the prevailing party a pamphlet
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confirming the truth of the conversation: Hamilton v. Pease, 38
Coan., zx1; or where a juror havincg interviewed the attorney of a
party expressed dissatisfaction with
the setled verdict when opened in'
court, and alargerverdict was finally
returned: Martin v. Morelock, 32
IQL., 485; or where a juror during a
recess asked the defendant for a
printed copy of the evidence adduced at a former trial, arid his
conclusion was guided thereby:
'Heffron v. Gallupe, 55 Me., 563; or
where a juror received information
voluntarily given by a friend of the
successfiil party, but such improper
influence was not exerted at the
request or knowledge of such party,
-the .verdicts were set aside. New
York, in Nesmith' v. Ins. Co., 8
Abb. Pr., 141, follows the Maine
rule, that the appearance of evil
should be avoided as much as the
evil itself. Where, however, the
communications between jurors
and successful parties can be explained, and are free from prejudicial influence, the verdict will n6t
be disturbed; as where a witness
stated that he saw two jurors couverse with the plaintiff; but the
juror swore that the interview had
no reference to the suit: Borland
v. Barrett, 76 Va., 128; or where
defendant merely rode with the
jury and counsel, on both sides,
with tacit consent of plaintiff:
Hahn v. Miller, 6o Io., 96: Bonnett
v. Glattfeldt, 120 Ill., i66, alier,
Ensign v. Harney, iS Neb., 330; or
where a juror makes a jocose remark to the successful party: Catterlin v. Frankfort City, 87 Ind.,
45; or where a juror was addressed
by the successful party, who did
not know that he was a juror, and
on being informed immediately
desisted: Wise v. Bosley, 32 1o., 34.

Sepiaration of Jury.-Although
in modem times the ancient re-

striction has yielded to a more enlightened reason, yet no rule tending to insure the impartial admin-

istration of justice and the purity
of jurors has in the slightest degree been abandoned or impaired.
Before deliberation separation of

jurors is a matter of judicial discretion in civil causes and upon indictments for misdemeanors, but
only under cautious instructions as
to decorum during the interim.
But even though the jury disobey
such instructions, such misconduct
will not provoke a new trial, provided the rights of the parties are
not injured: Morrow v. Co. of Saline, 21 Kan., 484; Downer v. Baxter, 30 Vt., 467; Stancell v. Kenan,
33 Ga., 56.

This rule is extended in certain
States to include even felonies,
capital and otlherwise. In Pennsylvania (burglary), and in Indiana,
South Carolina, Georgia, Kansas,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Connecticut, Illinois and Iowa (indict-

ments for. murder), the jury may
separate with the permission of the
Court or defendant without fier se
vitiating the verdict.
The better rule, however, as to
felonies is that the jury may not
separate after being sworn and
before bringing in their verdict.
See Wesley v. State, ii Hump.
(Tenn.), 502. In Wiley v. State, i
Swan, 256, it was held that the
consent of the prisoner should not
be asked or taken in any case of
felony, capital or otherwise; and
in Peiffer v. Com., i5 Pa., 468,
C. J. GIBsoN says: "Who dare
refuse to consent when the accommodations of those in whose hands
are the issues of his life or death
are involved in question?"
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Separation in felonies is ground.
ffMay a Jury Seal a Verdict on
for a new trial according to the
Sunday.?-It is so held in True v.
following cases unless it appears
Plumley, 36 Me., 466, and the
positively that such separation was weight of authority is that the jury
not attended by improper conduct
may deliberate, write out, seal up,
of the jurors,orby any circumstance or deliver to the Court theirverdict
calculated to exert an improper in- on Sunday: Hoghtaling v. Osborn,
fluence on the verdict: State v. Dol- 15 Johns., i 9 ; Huidekoper v. Colling, 37 Wis., 396; Riley v. State,
lins, 3 Watts, 56; State v. lFenlason,
95 Ind., 446; State v. Kendricks, 32
78 Me., 495; Webber v. Merrill, 34
Kan., 559; Cartwright v. State, 12
N. H., 202; State v. Rickets, 74
Lea (Tenn.), 620. See opinion of
N. C., 187.
C. J. Coix, in Crocket v. State, 52
Receiving Evidence Out of Court.
Wis., 2IT.
--Such misconduct, if prejudicial
As a general rule separation is to the parties, will vitiate the vernot allowed in aty case after the dict. Where the jury experimented
jury retire to find their verdict to test the transmission of sound,
until it is found and delivered in
or the size of shoe tracks in runopen court. However, in Armheler
ning: Jim v. State, 4 Hump., 289;
v. Lieberman, 33 0. St., 77, where or took into the jury room a pistol
the jury separated after retirement, not proved to have been the weapon
induced by a sudden alarm of fire used,' to experiment: Yates v.
in the near vicinity of the jury People, 38 Ill-, 536; or put on
room; and in State v. Conway, 23
worn-out shoes to determine tht
Minn., 291, where a juror left the character of tracks made~in swjury room, walked through a long dust, though done at the suggestion
1
hall into a crowded court room and of appellant: State v. Sanders, 68;
asked the judge a question, these Mo., 202 ; or where the jury, with,
acts were not deemed sufficient to
out the permission of the Court,
vitiate the verdict made after'reas- visited the locus in quo: Ortman
sembling.
v. R. R. Co., 32 Kan., 4r9; WinsSeparation of jurors after sealing
low v. Morrill, 68 Me., 362. See
their verdict is discretionary with also State v. Brown, 64 Mo., 367.
the Court in civil cases, and in
Indianapolis v, Scott, 72 Ind., 196;
some jurisdictions in criminal pro- or where jurors make evidential
secutions, and should the jury statements to their fellows, based
separate after verdict sealed, with- on personal knowledge as that a'
out permission of the Court, it will juror knew a female witness was
not be disturbed where it appears unchaste or unworthy of belief,
that there was no intentional wrong *Auschecks v. State, 6 Tex. Ap.,
or cause to suspect some abuse:
524; or that the plaintiff had conLeas v. Cool, 68 Ind., i66; Welch
vinced him of the justice of his
v. Welch, 9 Rich. (S. C.) L., 133;
case: Ritchie v. Holbrook, 7 S. &
Evans V. FOss, 49 N. H., 49o; Brown
R., 458; or that the defendant had
v. McConnell, i Bibb (Ky.), 265;
once stolen a hog: Booley v. State,
State v. Engle, i3 0., 490; Com.
4 Yerg. Tenn., Iru -in
all
v. Carrington, 116 Mass., 39; Jar- these cases the verdicts were set
rell v. State, 58 Ind., 293. See also aside.
Silvey v. State, 71 Ga., 552; ClayJurors are sworn to well and truly
ton v. State, ioo Ind., 201.
try the matters submitted to them
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in the case and a true verdict give
in accordance with the law and
evidence, that is, the sworn evidebice
in open court, under the safeguards
of the law and open to cross-examination and liable to be met with
countervailing proof by the party
affected by it.
Use of Papersand Books in the
jury Room.-It is useless to cite
authorities to show that the pleadings in- the case, judicial instructions, itemized accounts of claims
and the like, referred to but not
offered in evidence, and all papers
received in evidence, may be examined by the jury while deliberating.
As to depositions, the general
rule excludes them; for as C. J.
TIIGHmAN, in Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Binney, 238, says, it would
be f'unequal that while the jury
were not permitted to call before
them the witnesses who had been
examined in court, they should
take with them th depositions of
other witnesses not examined in
court" But see Iowa Revis. Code,
1887; Haregrove v. Millington, 8
Kan., 321. Where papers not in
evidence, as a bill of exceptions to
a former trial, are taken into the
jury room: Munde v. Lambie, 125
Mass., 367; or a letter attached to
a deposition: Toohy v. Sarvis, 78
Ind., 474; or judges' minutes or
notes of the trial: Meil v. Abel,
24 Wend., N. Y., 185; or an atlas
without permission of the Court:
State v. Lautz, 23 Kan., 728 ; State
v. Hartman, 46 Wis., 248; or scientific works: State v. Gillick, io Ia.,
98, the verdicts were set aside:
ImproperProcedurein determining upion a Verdict.-Verdicts obtained by chance ordrawingoflots:
Mitchell v. Ehle, io Wend., 596;
Livy v. Brannan, 39 Cal., 485; Codes

of Ark. and Tex., or quotient verdicts from marking, aggregation
and division: Johnston v. Husband,
22 Kan., 277, will always be set
aside, if there was alpreviousagreement to abide by the result whatever it may be. This is the test.
C. J. PARK in Haight v. Hoyt,
50 Conn., 584, says: "This mode
of arriving at a verdict is reprehensible, to say the least, .for it is
hardly possible that an honest result could be thus obtained. Some
jurors would mark a much larger
sum than their candid judgment
would dictate in order -to make
up the expected deficiency of
others, and so the honest jurors
would be deceived and a dishonest
verdict obtained."
See also .Crabtree v. State, 3

Sneed (Tenn.),

302.

If merely the mode is used, but
the result is freely assented to
afterward by each juror, the verdict will not be impeached: Tinkle
v. Dunivant, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 5o3;
Roy z. Coings, 112 Ill., 656; Miller
v. St. Louis, 5 Mo. Ap., 471.
If the jury suffer their verdict to
be coerced or restrained by the
judge or any person it cannot
stand, for it is not the result of unrestrained freedom, deliberation
and judgment: Slater 'v. Mead, 53
How. Pr. (N. Y.), 57; People v.
Williams, 24 Cal., 31.
Effect of Misconduct- Waiver.A party possessing information or
knowledge of a juror's misconduct,
or participating in it, cannot speculate upon the result and complain
when the verdict brings disaster to
his interests. But where counsel
had his attention called to the fact
that a- juror was reading a newspaper, Bullinger v. People, 95 Ill.,
394; or where defendant was informed that a juror asked defend-

